Maryland Criminal Attorney Blog

This criminal defense issue arises in situations where an unknown person makes a 911 call and the prosecutor tries to use the tape against a criminal defendant at trial. In State v. Parker, 365 Md. 299 (2001), the Maryland Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether the statements of two unidentified declarants to a police officer following a shooting were admissible. In determining whether the statements of the unidentified declarants were properly admitted by the trial court under the excited utterance hearsay exception, the appellate court observed that:

Where the identity of the hearsay declarant is unknown, the courts hold that the party seeking to introduce the excited utterance carries a heavy burden to prove the requisite indicia of reliability. It is held that the burden of the proponent is heightened, primarily because it is more difficult to establish personal observation and spontaneity where the declarant is unknown. Id. at 314.

The court analogized the facts of that case to a Third Circuit case involving unknown declarants at the scene of a car accident. In the Third Circuit case, the court found that the proponent of the hearsay statement had not satisfied the heavy burden of admissibility because “the record…was void of any circumstances from which it could be inferred that the declarant personally observed the accident and that the declarant was excited when he spoke.” Id.

Furthermore, under Crawford v. Washington, some of the statements made by the 911 caller were testimonial. These statements “were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). In further defining the nature of testimonial statements, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington concluded that statements made to a 911 operator that are not related to assisting in an ongoing emergency are testimonial. 547 U.S. 813, 827-28 (2006).

Continue reading " Is Hearsay is Still Admissible in Maryland if the Identify of the Declarant is Unknown? " »

Federal criminal defense lawyers are often faced with the issue of "double counting" when dealing with white-collar crimes sentencing. Double counting occurs when “one part of the [Sentencing] Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the [Sentencing] Guidelines.” U.S. v. Pena, 339 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. v. Hipenbecker, 115 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1997)). However, a trial court does not double count for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines by enhancing an offense level for two or more reasons when those reasons “address conceptually separate sentencing notions.” U.S. v. Phillips, 506 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2007).

Loss is broadly defined as the greater of actual loss or intended loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 commentary 3(A). Actual loss is “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.” Id. Intended loss is (1) “the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense” and (2) “includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id.

The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 defines “gross receipts from the offense” to include all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4) which defines “gross receipts from the offense” in the context of criminal forfeiture. The commentary also explains that “for purposes of subsection (b)(14)(A), the defendant shall be considered to have derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts if the gross receipts to the defendant individually, rather than to all participants, exceeded $1,000,000.” Specifically, the defendant is only liable for gross receipts that the defendant, himself, received as a result of the criminal activity.

Continue reading " Double Counting and the Federal Sentencing Guidlines " »

In this Maryland criminal case, Defendant Dillard was charged with possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and related offenses. Detective Smith was the State’s primary witness. During trial, it was brought to the court’s attention that during a lunch break two jurors walked by Detective Smith, patted him on the back and said “good job.” The defense attorney moved for a mistrial. The State asserted a mistrial was not necessary because the jurors had not made a specific comment about their opinions of Dillard’s guilt. The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial and refused to replace one of the jurors with an alternate. The jury convicted Dillard. Dillard appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the trial judge. The Court of Appeals reversed Dillard’s conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors to determine whether the jurors had reached a premature conclusion as to Dillard’s guilt or formed fixed opinions constituted an abuse of discretion.

It has become apparent from recent Freedom of Information Act disclosures that George Hugely had sent threatening emails shortly before his former girlfriend, Yeardley Love, was found murdered. After the incident, Hugely's lawyer tried to characterize Love's death as an "accident." Hugely, of course, is facing first degree murder charges.

One of the prerequisites of murder in the first degree is premeditation. We knew that Hugely forced himself into Love's apartment by literally breaking down her door. Now it has been confirmed that he previously sent Love threatening emails. The fact that he left the murder scene with Love's laptop can only show he was trying to cover his email tracks.

A conviction for murder in the first degree is looking more and more like a slam dunk for the prosecution as the case unfolds.